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CASENOTE; State v. Cheetham: Montana Supreme Court Refuses 
to Substitute Strickland Standard When Analyzing Substitution of 
Counsel Claims 
 
Cori Losing  
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
  
Distinct from a criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance 
of counsel is a defendant’s right to counsel of choice.1 In State v. 
Cheetham,2 the Montana Supreme Court erroneously analyzed the 
defendant’s substitution of counsel claim under a standard that blends 
substitution of counsel with ineffective assistance of counsel.3 
 
II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
  
In January 2014, Timothy Cheetham Sr. was charged with sexual 
intercourse without consent, sexual assault, and sexual abuse of children.4 
At trial, N.S. testified that Cheetham had touched her inappropriately on 
her chest and her vagina, had forced her to watch child pornography, and 
had forced her to have intercourse with Cheetham once.5 Cheetham was 
found guilty on all three counts.6  
 Prior to Cheetham’s sentencing hearing, defense attorney Steven 
Scott filed a motion to dismiss for negligent destruction of evidence.7 Scott 
argued that the “State failed to provide and preserve an exculpatory 
medical report of a forensic medical examination performed in 2006 on 
N.S. by Dr. Salisbury.”8 Scott quoted the report as stating “N.S.’s exam 
was within normal limits with copious amounts of hymen intact.9 This 
does not negate the possibility of a penetration injury.10 The narrowing 
noticed in the above exam, could be consistent with patient’s history and 
suspicious of a previous injury.”11 When Scott tried to obtain the medical 
report from the county attorney, the county attorney told Scott that the 
report “could not be obtained through Child Protective Services (CPS).”12 
Because CPS referenced the report, Scott determined the medical report 
                                           
1 Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 283 (5th Cir.1985) (citation omitted). 
2 373 P.3d 45 (Mont. 2016). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 48. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 49. 
7 Id. at 48. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 48. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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had been negligently destroyed.13 The State was neither able to obtain the 
report nor did it find the report favorable to Cheetham because it did not 
“negate the possibility of penetration injury.”14 Eventually, Scott was able 
to obtain the 2006 medical report.15 However, Scott decided to withdraw 
his motion before the district court ruled on it.16  
 On the day of his sentencing hearing, Cheetham appeared with a 
letter addressed to the court and the chief public defender.17 The letter 
alleged that Scott had failed to effectively assist Cheetham in his defense.18 
In his letter, Cheetham argued that, because N.S.’s hymen was intact, the 
medical report could have created reasonable doubt that the penetration 
incident had occurred; therefore, Cheetham requested that Scott be 
dismissed and replaced.19  
After questioning the county attorney, Scott, and Cheetham, the 
district court determined that there was “no total breakdown of 
communication” between Cheetham and Scott.20 Cheetham was sentenced 
to the Montana State Prison for 150 years.21 Cheetham appealed to the 
Montana Supreme Court, raising two issues: (1) whether the district court 
abused its discretion by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry into 
Cheetham’s request for substitute counsel; and (2) whether Cheetham was 
denied effective assistance of counsel.”22  
 Finding Cheetham’s second issue as not record-based, the State, 
in its brief, allocated a majority of its analysis to the issue of substitution 
of counsel.23 While the State argued that the district court’s inquiry into 
Cheetham’s claim was adequate, the State also insisted that the Court 
clarify its substitution of counsel standard.24 The State claimed that the 
Court should adopt the good cause standard applied in federal courts.25 
Under this standard, the State asserted that a defendant’s motion for 
substitution of counsel would be granted if the defendant showed good 
cause by establishing that there was a “conflict of interest, a complete 
breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict.”26 The State 
further argued that record-based ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
should be raised on direct appeal and should not be considered by the 
district court to determine whether the defendant should have been 
                                           
13 Id. 
14 Id. 







22 Id. at 49, 52. 
23 Appellee’s Brief at 13, State v. Cheetham, Feb. 24, 2016, No. DA 15-0156. 
24 Id. at 20, 23. 
25 Id. at 20. 
26 Id. 
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afforded substitute counsel.27 Instead, the state argued that courts should 
focus on whether a defendant has shown good cause to warrant 
substitution of counsel.28 
 
III.   MAJORITY OPINION 
 
A.   District Court’s Inquiry into Cheetham’s Request for Substitute 
Counsel. 
 
The Court first held that the district court’s inquiry into 
Cheetham’s request for substitution of counsel was adequate and any 
further hearing on Cheetham’s complaint was unnecessary.29 Forgoing the 
State’s suggestion that the Court adopt the federal standard for substitution 
of counsel, the Court applied the following test grounded in Montana case 
law: “the defendant bears the burden of presenting material facts to 
establish a ‘complete collapse’ of the attorney-client relationship, a total 
lack of communication, or ineffective assistance of counsel.”30  The 
majority stated that a district court’s inquiry into a defendant’s substitution 
of counsel claim is adequate when the court considers the “defendant’s 
factual complaints together with counsel’s specific explanations 
addressing the complaints.31 A cursory inquiry into the defendant’s 
complaint will not suffice.32 A hearing on the validity of the defendant’s 
complaint is only necessary when the court finds the defendant’s 
complaint is “seemingly substantial.”33  
Focusing on ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court reasoned 
that a complaint for ineffective assistance of counsel is “‘seemingly 
substantial’ if it satisfies the two-prong Strickland test: (1) that counsel’s 
performance was deficient; (2) that deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant.34 Relying on State v. Dethman, the Court claims that a 
difference in opinion over trial strategy between the defendant and his 
counsel does not give rise to a seemingly substantial complaint.35 
Therefore, the Court determined that the district court’s inquiry was 
adequate because the district court correctly compared Cheetham’s factual 
allegations to Scott’s explanations of Cheetham’s complaints to conclude 
Cheetham did not raise a substantial complaint.36 
                                           
27 Id. at 22. 
28 Id. 
29 Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 49, 51–53. 
30 Id. at 50, 52.  
31 Id. at 51. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 50. 
35 Id. at 50. 
36 Id. at 51. 
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Since the district court suggested a total breakdown of 
communication was required to obtain new counsel, the Montana Supreme 
Court acknowledged that a “total breakdown of communication may be 
separate grounds for obtaining new counsel from a claim that counsel is 
rendering ineffective assistance.”37 Without articulating a test for 
determining whether there was a total breakdown of communication 
between Cheetham and his attorney, the Court agreed with the district 
court’s finding that it was relevant to inquire whether the communication 
between the two was civil because the complaint occurred late in 
Cheetham’s court proceedings when only the sentencing hearing 
remained.38 Affirming the district court’s finding, the Court found that 
Cheetham failed to raise a seemingly substantial claim; therefore, further 
inquiry by the district court was unnecessary.39 
 
B.   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
Because Cheetham’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
Scott’s failure to introduce the 2006 medical report was not record-based, 
the Court declined to address Cheetham’s second issue on direct appeal.40 
 
IV.   JUSTICE MCKINNON’S CONCURRENCE 
 
Agreeing with the Court’s analysis on the second issue, Justice 
McKinnon focused her concurrence solely on the first issue. 41 Justice 
McKinnon stated that the Court failed to articulate a standard for district 
court judges to apply when conducting their initial inquiry into a 
defendant’s substitution of counsel claims.42 In her analysis, Justice 
McKinnon noted that the Court continues to require satisfaction of both 
prongs of Strickland  “without setting forth any analytical distinction from 
a substitution claim.”43 Justice McKinnon also claimed that the Court does 
not actually apply the Strickland test; rather, the Court determined that 
“Cheetham did not raise a ‘seemingly substantial’ complaint of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.”44 
Finding the majority’s blending of ineffective assistance of 
counsel with a substitution of counsel claim flawed, Justice McKinnon, 
like the State, urged the Court to clarify its inconsistent precedent on 
substitution of counsel claims by adopting the standard applied in the 
                                           
37 Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 51–52. 
38 Id. at 52. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 52–53. 
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majority of federal courts.45 The standard, Justice McKinnon states, should 
require the defendant to show “a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable 
conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney 
and the defendant” to warrant substitution of counsel.46 In evaluating 
whether substitution of counsel is warranted, Justice McKinnon noted that 
the trial court should employ the following facts and circumstances test: 
“timeliness of the motion, adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the 
defendant’s complaint, and whether the attorney-client conflict was so 
great that it resulted in total lack of communication preventing an adequate 
defense.”47  
Unlike the majority, Justice McKinnon further analyzed the total 
breakdown in communication issue. In her reasoning, Justice McKinnon 
asserted that conflict over differences of trial strategy between the 
defendant and his attorney could lead to a total breakdown in 
communication.48 Therefore, Justice McKinnon asserted that the trial 
judge’s inquiry into the defendant’s claim must focus on “whether the 
serious breakdown in communication results in an inadequate defense.”49 
While Justice McKinnon furthers the Court’s analysis and urges the 
adoption of a clearer standard for substitution of counsel claims, Justice 
McKinnon agreed with the majority that there was no total breakdown in 
communication between Cheetham and his attorney.50 Therefore, Justice 
McKinnon, like the majority, found that further inquiry by the district 
court was unwarranted.51 
 
IV.   ANALYSIS 
 
A.   Judicial Skepticism of Substitution of Counsel Claims 
 
Judicial skepticism may lead judges to deny even worthy 
substitution of counsel motions.52 For indigent defendants like Cheetham, 
judges are less likely to find a breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship to justify granting a motion for substitution of counsel.53 
Judicial skepticism results from a judge’s suspicions of the defendant and 
his counsel, coupled with imperfect tests that district courts are required 
to apply to substitution of counsel motions.54 Generally, judges may 
                                           
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 55–56. 





52 Lindsay R. Goldstein, A View From the Bench: Why Judges Fail to Protect Trust and Confidence 
in the Lawyer-Client Relationship—An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 
2682 (2005). 
53 Id. at 2680–81. 
54 Id. at 2682. 
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experience the following concerns about a defendant’s motion for 
substitute counsel: (1) granting the motion will not actually resolve the 
conflict between the defendant and his counsel; (2) the defendant is 
manipulating the judge into delaying the defendant’s trial; (3) the 
defendant will “abuse the judicial process;” (4) appointing a new lawyer 
will create an economic burden on society; and (5) the defendant’s 
concerns about his attorney are related to the larger issue of the defendant 
having criminal charges brought against him.55  
While judges often recognize that disagreements between the 
defendant and his counsel exist, judges are unlikely to find any 
disagreement rising to the level of a breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship.56 Judges often note that conflicts between a defendant and 
his attorney are inevitable since the defendant objects to the criminal 
charges being brought against him, the defendant may have difficulty 
working with others, or the defendant and his counsel disagree on 
counsel’s proposed trial strategy.57 One of the root causes of judicial 
skepticism is the economic implication of appointing new counsel and 
the impact granting a motion for substitution of counsel will have on 
judicial economy. Judges often doubt whether granting a defendant’s 
motion for substitution of counsel is worth the increased expense of 
appointing a new attorney to represent the defendant.58 Further, 
substituting counsel requires a pause in the judicial process, leading to 
overcrowded judicial dockets.59  
 
B.   Reliance on Strickland Standard in Substitution of Counsel Claims 
 
The Sixth Amendment affords a defendant the right to choice of 
counsel.60 A defendant’s implicit right to substitute counsel is often 
viewed as an extension of the right to choice of counsel.61 However, the 
right to choice of counsel does not extend to indigent defendants who have 
appointed counsel.62 Instead, indigent defendant’s implied right to 
substitution of counsel is based on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel.63 A defendant’s right to substitute counsel is invoked when a 
breakdown in communication between the defendant and his counsel 
becomes so grave that it frustrates counsel’s ability to provide an adequate 
defense.64 Therefore, this qualified right is afforded when counsel’s failure 
                                           
55 Id. at 2691–92, 2697. 
56 Id. at 2693. 
57 Id. at 32 at 2694.  
58 Id. at 2697. 
59 Id. at 2697–98. 
60 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
61 United States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 580, 587 (4th Cir. 2011). 
62 Id. at 587–88. 
63 Id. at 588. 
64 Id. 
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to assist the defendant in his defense violates the defendant’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel.65  
While a defendant’s right to substitution of counsel concerns the 
right to effective assistance of counsel, the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts do not equate the Strickland 
ineffective assistance of counsel standard with the substitution of counsel 
standard.66 Like these circuit courts, Justice McKinnon proposes that to 
warrant substitution of counsel, the standard should require a defendant to 
demonstrate “conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete 
breakdown in communication between attorney and the defendant.”67 
However, unlike the federal standard, the Montana Supreme Court 
outlines a substitution of counsel standard that includes ineffective 
assistance of counsel,68 thus concluding that the Strickland standard 
applies to Cheetham’s complaints.69 
The Sixth Circuit has ruled on the issue of incorporating 
Strickland into substitution of counsel claims in Wison v. Mintzes. The 
Sixth Circuit notes that Strickland should not be applied to substitution of 
counsel claims because the violation of the right to counsel of choice does 
not mean that the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel is 
also violated.70 In Wilson, the Sixth Circuit stated that applying the 
Strickland standard for substitution of counsel motions would require a 
defendant “who cannot communicate with counsel, who is dissatisfied 
with counsel or whose defense is burdened by a conflict of interest to prove 
that counsel’s conduct rises to the level of constitutional 
ineffectiveness.”71 The Sixth Circuit further stated that this high burden 
for proving ineffective counsel should not be placed on any criminal 
defendant.72 Placing such a burden on the defendant would undermine 
certain principles of the defendant’s qualified right to counsel of choice;73 
therefore, applying the Strickland ineffective assistance standard to 
substitution of counsel claims is flawed.74 
In Wilson, the Sixth Circuit noted that it was not aware of any 
court that places on defendants the high burden proving ineffective 
assistance of counsel before granting the defendant’s motion for 
                                           
65 Id. 
66 United States v. Whaley, 788 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jones, 795 F.3d 791, 
796 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 979–80 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185,188 
(3d Cir. 1982); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1981). 
67 Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 55–56 (McKinnon, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 
494, 499 (8th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S. Ct. 632 (1992)). 
68 Id. at 50 (majority opinion). 
69 Id. 
70 Wilson, 761 F.2d at 283 (6th Cir. 1985). 
71 761 F.2d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 1985). 
72 Wilson, 761 F.2d at 283. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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substitution of counsel.75 This statement is true when focusing on 
substitution of counsel cases in the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts. While these circuit courts are not as 
forward as the Sixth Circuit about the problematic effects of equating the 
ineffective assistance standard with substitution of counsel, these circuit 
courts, nonetheless, do not incorporate the Strickland standard into the 
substitution of counsel analysis.76  
In her concurrence, Justice McKinnon claims that the Court 
incorporates ineffective assistance of counsel with substitution of counsel 
without providing any analytical distinction.77 Justice McKinnon correctly 
notes that while the Court looks to Strickland when reviewing Cheetham’s 
substitution of counsel claim, the Court does not actually apply Strickland 
to Cheetham’s claim.78 However, the district court, following the Court, 
appears to have applied Strickland to Cheetham’s complaint. During the 
district court’s questioning of Cheetham and his attorney, the district court 
focused on whether communication between the two parties was civil.79 
Nevertheless, in its finding, the district court also noted that it had 
reservations about replacing Scott as Cheetham’s attorney because Scott 
had effectively assisted Cheetham in his defense.80 By allowing effective 
counsel to be an issue in Cheetham’s substitution of counsel claim, the 
district court is following the Strickland standard. In doing so, Montana 
courts have placed a high burden on a defendant that requires a showing 
that his attorney’s performance was deficient rather than simply showing 
a breakdown in communication, a conflict of interest, or an irreconcilable 
conflict.81 Therefore, the Court justified the Sixth Circuit’s concern when 
the Court’s chosen substitution of counsel standard required a defendant 
to show that he has received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to 
granting substitute counsel.  
In the future, the Court should adopt the federal standard for 
substitution of counsel claims in order to avoid blending effective 
assistance of counsel with substitution of counsel claims at the expense of 
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. The Sixth Amendment affords 
criminal defendants the right to a fair trial.82 For indigent defendants, 
implicit in this right is the right to choice of counsel when the defendant’s 
appointed counsel has failed to provide effective legal assistance.83 Central 
                                           
75 Wilson, 761 F.2d at 283 (6th Cir. 1985). 
76 Whaley, 788 F.2d at 583 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones, 795 F.3d at 796 (8th Cir. 2015); Sullivan, 431 F.3d 
at 979–80 (6th Cir. 2005); Padilla, 819 F.2d at 955 (10th Cir. 1987); Young, 482 F.2d at 995 (5th Cir. 
1973); Morris, 714 F.2d at 673 (7th Cir. 1983); Welty, 674 F.2d at 188 (3d Cir. 1982); McKee, 649 
F.2d at 931 (2d Cir. 1981). 
77 Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 54 (McKinnon, J., concurring).  
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 51 (majority opinion). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 55–56 (McKinnon, J., concurring). 
82 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
83 Smith, 640 F.3d at 588. 
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to the attorney-client relationship are the principles of trust and 
confidence.84 If a client does not trust his attorney, the attorney’s ability to 
assist the client will be materially impaired.85 Effective representation is 
unlikely when there is a complete breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship.86 Without a clear standard for substitution of counsel claims 
that ensures an indigent defendant has a meaningful level of confidence in 
their counsel, Montana risks obtaining convictions that are less reliable. 
Therefore, the Court must ensure the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights 
are not violated in order to avoid a breakdown in the adversarial process.   
 
V.   FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
 
The Court’s refusal to eliminate the Strickland test from the 
substitution of counsel standard will arguably result in more denials of 
defendants’ motions for substitution of counsel. After a court denies an 
indigent defendant’s motion for substitution of counsel, the defendant will 
have two options: (1) continue with his present counsel, or (2) proceed pro 
se.87 If the defendant continues with his present counsel, it is likely that 
the relationship between the two could be strained and the defendant’s 
trust in his counsel, and the justice system, will deteriorate. If the 
defendant continues pro se, the defendant will likely be prejudiced by his 
lack of legal expertise.88 Furthermore, the rise in pro se litigants has 
“disrupted the efficiency of the courts, causing courtroom delays and 
overburdening judges, attorneys, and court staff.”89 Therefore, future 
implications of not adopting the federal standard for substitution of 
counsel claims could prejudice the defendant and have a negative impact 
on Montana courts.  
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 
 A criminal defendant’s right to choice of counsel is 
distinguishable from a defendant’s right to effective assistance of 
counsel.90 In Cheetham, the Court refused to adopt the federal standard for 
substitution of counsel claims, leaving district courts with an unclear 
standard to apply to a defendant’s substitution of counsel claims.91 In 
doing so, the Court blended the Strickland ineffective assistance standard 
                                           
84 Goldstein, supra n. 52 at 2668.  
85 Id. at 2669. 
86 Id. at 2674. 
87 Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 50. 
88 Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se 
Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1548 (2005). 
89 Id. at 1548. 
90 Wilson, 761 F.2d at 283 (5th Cir.1985) (citation omitted). 
91 Cheetham, 373 P.3d at 52.  
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with the substitution of counsel standard.92 Therefore, unless a defendant 
can articulate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, Montana 
courts likely will not grant a defendant’s motion for substitution of 
counsel. If the Court continues to use the Montana standard for 
substitution of counsel claims, there will likely be a rise in both the number 
of strained attorney-defendant relationships and pro se defendants. This 
rise will likely have a detrimental effect on indigent criminal defendants 
and Montana courts. Therefore, the Court should reconsider Justice 
McKinnon’s concurrence and the State’s recommendation and choose to 

































                                           
92 Id. at 54 (McKinnon, J., concurring). 
